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ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER V. HICKS:
QUESTIONING THE BASIC ASSUMPTION
Deborah A. Calloway*
[Tihe prima facie case "raises an inference of discrimina-
tion ... because we presume these acts, if otherwise unex-
plained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of
impermissible factors."'
[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondis-
criminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force
more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition
of the population in the community from which employees are
hired.2
In enacting Title VII, Congress was primarily concerned with bring-
ing an end to disparate treatment, the most basic form of discrimina-
tion. Indeed, since its passage nearly two decades ago, Title VII has
played a vital role in enabling victims of disparate treatment to seek
redress. Because direct evidence of discrimination rarely is available,
Title VIl's success in rooting out disparate treatment has been due, in
large measure, to methods of proof based on the assumption that, ab-
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. B.A. Middlebury College;
J.D. Georgetown University Law Center.
The ideas in this Article came to light during the writing and editing of the third edition
of CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (3d ed. 1994). I want to
acknowledge the significant impact that two of my co-authors, Professor Michael Zimmer and
Professor Charles Sullivan of Seton Hall School of Law, have had on the thoughts that ulti-
mately became this Article. At the University of Connecticut. I am grateful to Professor Tanina
Rostain for discussing Hicks with me and for her helpful comments and to Professor Ion Bauer
for keeping me updated on the latest developments. Finally, if Jennifer Barrett. Editor-in-Chief
of the Connecticut Law Review, had not suggested that I write an article on Hicks and then
pressed me with deadlines, my commitments to Little. Brown & Co. would surely have con-
signed this Article (along with others contemplated but never written) to the eternal flanm of
the "back burner."
I. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 450 U.S. 248. 254 (1981) (quoting
Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
2. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324. 340 (1977).
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sent explanation, adverse treatment of statutorily protected groups is
more likely than not the result of discrimination. Throughout the history
of Title VII, this basic assumption has served as a cornerstone of dispa-
rate treatment actions.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has questioned this basic assump-
tion. With its decision in Saint Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,3 the
Court joined academics, judges, and a growing segment of the Ameri-
can population that has come to believe that discrimination no longer
exists. Under this view, the failure of African Americans, women, and
other groups protected by Title VII to achieve equal employment oppor-
tunities results not from discrimination, but rather from inadequate
motivation or deficient personal and work skills. When the Supreme
Court in Hicks refused to recognize a presumption of discrimination
based on a prima facie case and a discredited nondiscriminatory expla-
nation, the Court both questioned the continued prevalence of discrimi-
nation and invited lower court judges and juries to do the same. Unfor-
tunately, lower courts already have launched an attack on the concept
of discrimination, searching for alternative explanations for disparate
treatment of protected groups. Juries, drawn from a society that believes
discrimination has been eliminated, may also view alleged discrimina-
tion with skepticism.
In this Article, I chronicle the continued prevalence of virulent
discrimination in our society, discrimination that is completely at odds
with the erroneous belief that discrimination is either diminishing or
eradicated. Given the continued operation of discrimination, the basic
assumption remains valid-absent explanation, different treatment of
protected group individuals is the result of discrimination. I argue that
abandoning this basic assumption is inconsistent with reality and unduly
burdens plaintiffs seeking redress under Title VII because it allows
judges and juries to act on their unfounded and inaccurate assumptions
about discrimination. Title VII requires plaintiffs to prove that they
were victims of discrimination, but in a world in which discrimination
is commonplace and often subtle, the absence of any other credible
explanation should satisfy that burden. I conclude by urging Congress
to amend Title VII to overrule Hicks and send a message to the Su-
preme Court and lower courts that they underestimate Title VII's com-
mitment to eradicating intentional discrimination.
3. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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I. THE OPINION IN HICKS
Melvin Hicks, an African American, was discharged from his job as
a shift commander at St. Mary's Honor Center correctional facility,
allegedly because of numerous deficiencies in his job performance,
including threatening his immediate supervisor, John Powell, during a
heated altercation.4 Hicks was employed for six years as a correctional
officer at Saint Mary's Honor Center, a correctional facility operated by
the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources
("MDCHR"). Throughout most of Hicks' tenure at the facility, he was
rated by his superiors as competent and was never disciplined. In 1980,
he was promoted to the supervisory position of shift commander.
In 1983, as a consequence of an investigation into the management
of Saint Mary's by MDCHR, several staff changes took place at the
facility. These changes included hiring Steve Long as superintendent
and John Powell as Hicks' immediate supervisor. Both Long and
Powell are white. Soon after Long and Powell were hired, the success-
ful relationship between Hicks and the management of Saint Mary's
began to deteriorate. In 1984, Hicks became the subject of a series of
disciplinary actions stemming from alleged violations of institutional
rules by his subordinates as well as a brawl between inmates under his
supervision. As a result of these incidents, Hicks was demoted. None of
the other employees involved, however, were disciplined.5
Hicks learned of his demotion at a meeting attended by both Powell
and Long. After the meeting, Powell ordered Hicks to turn over his
shift commander manual. After Hicks refused, "the two men exchanged
heated words. [Hicks] then indicated that he would 'step outside' with
Powell."6 When Powell sought disciplinary action against Hicks based
on this exchange, a disciplinary board recommended a three-day suspen-
sion. Long, however, advocated for termination, and Hicks was fired on
June 7, 1984.'
Throughout Hicks' tenure as shift supervisor, he reported numerous
violations of institutional rules to Powell, many of which were egre-
gious. These reports were largely ignored. For example, Hicks recom-
mended that one of his subordinates be disciplined for insubordination
due to the subordinate's use of profane words toward Hicks after re-
4. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 489 (Sth Cir. 1992).
5. Id. at 489.
6. Id.
7. 1d.
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ceiving a poor service rating. Powell dismissed the recommendations,
concluding that "[the subordinate] was 'merely venting frustration."' 8
Hicks also reported officers who allowed guns into the facility; officers
who permitted inmates to obtain unauthorized work passes; officers who
left the front desk unattended; and an officer who took a set of facility
keys home. None of these employees were disciplined. All of them
were white.9
The Supreme Court described the trial court's decision rejecting
Hicks' discrimination claim:
The District court, acting as trier of fact in this bench trial,
found that the reasons petitioners gave were not the real reasons
for respondent's demotion and discharge. It found that respon-
dent was the only supervisor disciplined for violations commit-
ted by his subordinates; that similar and even more serious
violations committed by respondent's coworkers were either
disregarded or treated more leniently; and that Powell manufac-
tured the final verbal confrontation in order to provoke respon-
dent into threatening him. It nonetheless held that respondent
had failed to carry his ultimate burden of proving that his race
was the determining factor in petitioners' decision first to de-
mote and then to dismiss him. In short, the District court con-
cluded that "although [respondent] has proven the existence of a
crusade to terminate him, he has not proven that the crusade
was racially rather than personally motivated."'
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision with a
detailed and extensive opinion interpreting and applying the Court's
earlier precedents. The dissent provided an equally lengthy and detailed
counter-argument. Stripping away the extensive legal verbiage and pars-
ing of precedent, however, the Court's holding in Hicks may be stated
briefly: When a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation in violation of Title VII" and the defendant has met its burden
of articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason ("LNDR") for its
conduct, the presumption created by the prima facie case loses its force
and the judge (or jury) may find discrimination, but is not required to
do so as a matter of law--even if the plaintiff proves that the defen-
8. Id. at 490.
9. Id.
10. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748 (1993).
11. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
[Vol. 26:997
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dant was not, in fact, motivated by the asserted nondiscriminatory rea-
son.
Because the Court remanded the case for a determination whether
the district court's finding of no discrimination was clearly erroneous, it
remains possible that discrimination must be found as a matter of law
when the asserted LNDR is proven to be false and there is no other
evidence suggesting an absence of discrimination. A fair reading of the
case, however, suggests that once the employer articulates a nondiscrim-
inatory reason, the trier of fact no longer is required to find discrimina-
tion-whether or not the employer's alleged reason is true and whether
or not any additional evidence is presented.'2
Is this holding consistent with the language of Title VII? Title VII's
prohibition against discrimination rivals the United States Constitution
in its brevity and ambiguity. Employers are prohibited from "discrimi-
nating against" employees "because of' their membership in an enumer-
ated protected group. 3 In previous individual disparate treatment cases,
the Court has concluded that in establishing a violation, the plaintiff
bears the burden of demonstrating that the employer's action was based
on the plaintiff's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." The
1991 Civil Rights Act amended Title VII to provide that the statute is
violated if the employee's membership in a group protected by Title
VII was one "motivating factor" for the employer's decision. The 1991
12. Some lower courts have interpreted Hicks to require direct evidence of discriminatory
intent. See, e.g., Card v. Hercules, Inc., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 21631 (10th Cir. 1993); Elmore
v. Capstan, 1993 U.S. Dist LEXIS 10865 (D. Kan. July 12. 1993); Wright v. Office of Mental
Health, New York State Psychiatric Inst., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9275 (S.D.N.Y. July 12.
1993). Most lower courts, however, recognize that Hicks permits courts to infer discrimination
when a plaintiff who has presented a prima facie case succeeds in discrediting the employer's
proffered nondiscriminatory reason. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co.. 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25127 (1st Cir. Sept. 29, 1993); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 62 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1153, 1155 (2d Cir. 1993); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134
(2d Cir. 1993).
13. Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970 ed. & Supp. V). provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges or employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunitiw or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
14. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Texas Dep't of Communi-
ty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
1994]
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VII was one "motivating factor" for the employer's decision. The 1991
amendments confirm that it is the employee's burden to "demonstrate"
this motivating factor.'5 Only then is liability established and the bur-
den shifted to the employer to limit remedies by demonstrating that the
same decision would have been reached even absent the prohibited
motivation.16 Hicks, therefore, is fully consistent with both prior case
law and the amended statute insofar as the Court allocated to Hicks the
burden of establishing that his employer was motivated, at least in part,
by his race.
Hicks also is consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 301 which
describes the relationship between presumptions and burdens of proof:
a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed
the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the
presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of
proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains
throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally
cast. 17
The question raised by Hicks, however, is not merely who bears the
burden of proving discriminatory intent, but rather what evidence is
sufficient to meet the burden of persuasion imposed on the plaintiff."8
In Burdine, the Court held that discriminatory intent can be inferred if
the employee establishes a prima facie case by proving that she is a
member of a class protected by Title VII who applied and was rejected
for an available position for which she was qualified. The Court went
on to explain the theory behind the prima facie case:
The prima facie case serves an important function in the litiga-
15. Statute Section 703(m) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-2(a) (1970 ed. & Supp. V)
(amended 1991).
16. Statute Section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-2(a) (1970 ed. & Supp. V)
(amended 1991).
17. FED. R. EvID. 310.
18. While Justice Scalia characterized the approach of the court of appeals and the dissent as
improperly shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, this view is clearly erroneous. Neither
the dissent nor the court of appeals required the employer to bear the burden of proving that
the proffered reason was the real reason for discharging Hicks. Rather, they would have held
that when the plaintiff who has established a prima facie ease proves, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the employer did not rely on the proffered reason, this evidence creates an
inference of discriminatory intent that satisfies the plaintiff's burden of proof. The plaintiff bears
the burden of proving the prima facie case and of discrediting the employer's alleged nondis-
criminatory reason. The plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion with respect to discriminatory
intent. The court merely defines the evidence sufficient to meet that burden.
[Vol. 26:997
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tion: it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons
for the plaintiff's rejection .... the prima facie case "raises an
inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts,
if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors." Establishment of the
prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the em-
ployer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the
trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence and if the employer
is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter
judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in
the case.'9
Hicks does not purport to challenge the evidentiary impact of estab-
lishing a prima facie case." Nonetheless, Hicks questions the validity
of the assumption articulated in Furnco and cited with approval in
Burdine that "impermissible factors" or discrimination are "more likely
than not" the explanation for an employer's adverse treatment of a
qualified member of a protected classification in the absence of an
alternative explanation. The Court, in Hicks, held that merely disproving
the defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for acting is insuffi-
cient to meet the plaintiff's burden of proving discrimination. As the
Court characterized the evidence presented in Hicks, there was more on
the record than merely the prima facie case and the employer's discred-
ited explanation that Hicks had violated rules and verbally abused his
supervisor. The Court explained the district court's finding of no dis-
crimination:
Various considerations led it to this conclusion, including the
fact that two blacks sat on the disciplinary review board that
recommended disciplining respondent, that respondent's black
subordinates who actually committed the violations were not
19. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (citing Fumco Constr. Co. v. Waters. 438 U.S. 567. 577
(1978)).
20. In Hicks, the Court stated:
At the close of the defendant's case, the court is asked to decide whether an issue of
fact remains for the trier of fact to determine. None does if, on the evidence pre-
sented, (1) any rational person would have to find the existence of facts constituting
a prima facie case, and (2) the defendant has failed to meet its burden of produc-
tion-i.e., has failed to introduce evidence which, taken as true, would permit the
conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. In that
event, the court must award judgment to the plaintiff as a matter of law.
Hicks, 113 S. CL at 2748.
19941
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
disciplined, and that "the number of black employees at St.
Mary's remained constant.'
St. Mary's treatment of similarly situated black employees may well
suggest that its adverse treatment of Hicks was not based on race.
Similarly, if the "constant" number of black employees at St. Mary's
Honor Center exceeded or was representative of the percentage of quali-
fied black employees in the relevant labor market, this fact could un-
dermine Hicks' attempt to establish discriminatory intent. But why is
the race of the disciplinary board members relevant?
The Court returned to this issue in its effort to paint the dissent's state-
ment of prevailing law22 as unreasonable:
Assume that 40% of a business' work force are members of a
particular minority group, a group which comprises only 10%
of the relevant labor market. An applicant, who is a member of
that group, applies for an opening for which he is minimally
qualified, but is rejected by a hiring officer of that same minor-
ity group, and the search to fill the opening continues. The
rejected applicant files suit for racial discrimination under Title
VII, and before the suit comes to trial, the supervisor who
conducted the company's hiring is fired. Under McDonnell
Douglas, the plaintiff has a prima facie case, and under the
dissent's interpretation of our law not only must the company
come forward with some explanation for the refusal to hire
(which it will have to try to confirm out of the mouth of its
now antagonistic former employee), but the jury must be in-
structed that, if they find that explanation to be incorrect, they
must assess damages against the company, whether or not they
believe the company was guilty of racial discrimination. The
disproportionate minority makeup of the company's work force
and the fact that its hiring officer was of the same minority
group as the plaintiff will be irrelevant, because the plaintiff's
case can be proved "indirectly by showing that the employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 23
21. Id. at 2748 n.2.
22. The dissent would have held that a plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case of dis-
crimination and discredits the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason has met the
plaintiff's burden of persuasion that the employer acted with a discriminatory intent. Id. at 2756
(Souter, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 2750-51.
1004 [Vol. 26:997
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The Court criticized the dissent's approach because this "utterly compel-
ling evidence that discrimination was not the reason will then be ex-
cluded from the jury's consideration." 24
While the Court in this passage seems in part to be disturbed by
the unquestioned reality that, under Title VII, an employer may be held
liable for the acts of its supervisors,25 the Court seems to be most out-
raged that the dissent's approach would deprive the court or jury from
considering the "compelling evidence" that the employer's workforce in-
cludes a disproportionate number of individuals of the same race as the
plaintiff and that the decision maker "was of the same minority group
as the plaintiff."
What is so "compelling" about this evidence? Consider the racial
make-up of the employer's workforce. While such evidence may sug-
gest a lack of discriminatory intent, it will not suffice by itself to over-
come a prima facie case of discrimination. The racial make-up of the
workforce is not a nondiscriminatory or neutral reason for firing the
plaintiff. It is not a "reason" at all. In addition, even if the employer's
workforce is, for example, ninety percent female, this fact does not
preclude discrimination in the employer's decision not to hire or pro-
mote a female: The decision maker in this instance may not be the
same as the decision maker who hired the other female employees; the
employer's female workers may all hold nonsupervisory positions while
this employee is applying for a supervisory position; or the employer
may have decided that there are too many females in this workplace
and that no additional females will be hired. This evidence is compel-
ling only if you question the basic assumption that, absent a nondis-
criminatory explanation, it is more likely than not that adverse treatment
of a woman or a member of a minority group is the result of discrimi-
nation.26
24. Id at 2751 n.5.
25. Section 701(b) defines the term "employee' to include an employer's agents. The Su-
preme Court has indicated that an employer's liability for the actions of its super isors should
be resolved by applying common law agency principals. Courts have had some difficulty deter-
mining how agency principals apply in the context of hostile environment sexual harassment
cases when harassing supervisors act to satisfy their own needs, rather than their employer's
interests. On the other hand, when a supervisor who has the authority to hire and fire on behalf
of her employer exercises that authority in a discriminatory manner, there is little question that
these actions are within the scope of the supervisor's employment and that the employer is
liable. See MICHAEL J. ZtMwER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, RICHARD F. RICHARDS & DEBORAH A.
CALLOWAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON E.MPLOYMENT LAW (3d ed. 1994).
26. In Espinoza v. Farah Mfg., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). the fact that "more than 96% of the
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What about evidence that the decision maker is from the same
minority group as the plaintiff? Again, this evidence does not constitute
a nondiscriminatory reason that will, if true, overcome a prima facie
case. The race or gender of the decision maker is not a "reason" at all.
Further, membership in the same group as the plaintiff is not inconsis-
tent with discriminatory intent. For example, cases in which affirmative
action is challenged under Title VII often involve decision makers who
are of the same race or gender as the plaintiff. Again, this evidence is
compelling evidence of nondiscriminatory intent only if you question
the basic assumption inherent in the prima facie case: absent explana-
tion it is more likely than not that adverse treatment of a woman or
minority group member is the result of discrimination.
Consider also the application of Hicks to a case in which the only
evidence on record is the plaintiffs prima facie case and the
defendant's discredited reason. For example, suppose the plaintiff, a
female, presents a prima facie case of discrimination by establishing
that she applied for an entry level job, was rejected, and the position
remained open. The defendant testifies that he didn't hire the plaintiff
because she is blond. The plaintiff has brown hair and presents evi-
dence that her hair was the same color on the day she applied for the
position. Under Hicks:
If... the defendant has succeeded in carrying its burden of produc-
tion, the McDonnell Douglas framework-with its presumptions
and burdens-is no longer relevant .. . . The presumption,
having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come for-
ward with some response, simply drops out of the picture. The
defendant's "production" . . . having been made, the trier of
fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question: whether plaintiff
has proven "that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against [him]" because of his race .. . . [R]ejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to
infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the
Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such
rejection, "[no] additional proof of discrimination is required."
employees" at Farah were of the same protected classification as the plaintiff defeated the
plaintiff's argument that the employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring her
was a pretext for discrimination. In Espinoza. however, the Court noted that "statistics such as
these do not automatically shield an employer from a charge of unlawful discrimination ... .
Id. at 93.
[Vol. 26:997
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But the Court of Appeals' holding that rejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff
disregards the fundamental principle... that a presumption
does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our repeated
admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the
"ultimate burden of persuasion."
27
While the Court clearly was correct in imposing the ultimate burden
of persuasion on the plaintiff, the import of the quoted passage is that
presenting a prima facie case and discrediting the defendant's proffered
nondiscriminatory reason for acting is not necessarily sufficient to carry
that burden. While the Court may have been contemplating the situation
in which other evidence has been presented at trial, the decision leaves
open the possibility that even when there is no additional evidence on
the record, the court (or jury) may decline to find discriminatory intent.
If this is what Hicks stands for, then Hicks questions the validity of
the basic assumption that discrimination is "more likely than not" the
explanation for an employer's adverse treatment of a qualified member
of a protected classification in the absence of an alternative explanation.
Otherwise, adverse treatment (prima facie case) taken together with the
absence of an alternative explanation (discrediting the employer's rea-
son) should be sufficient evidence to meet the plaintiff's burden of
showing that discrimination is demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence.
It is possible, of course, that this is not what the Court intended to
hold in Hicks. The Court's ultimate decision to remand the case for a
determination whether the district court's finding was clearly erroneous
may suggest that the trier of fact must have additional evidence on the
record other than the prima facie case and the discredited nondiscrimi-
natory reason in order to conclude that the plaintiff has failed to prove
discriminatory intent. But even if this is a reasonable interpretation of
the case, Hicks nonetheless questions the basic assumption by citing the
racial make-up of the employer's workplace and the race of the deci-
sion makers as compelling evidence of nondiscrimination.
In short, Hicks indicates that the Court does not truly believe that
the prima facie case creates an inference of discrimination. Although it
has not overruled McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, it has seriously
questioned the underlying assumption on which the prima facie case is
based: that discrimination exists in this society and that absent some
27. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
1994]
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other explanation, discrimination is the likely explanation for the ad-
verse treatment regularly experienced by women and members of mi-
nority groups. McDonnell Douglas and Burdine did not distinguish
between employers of the same race as the plaintiff and employers of a
different race. The prima facie case requires only that the plaintiff es-
tablish that she is a member of a protected group.
II. IMPLICATIONS
Hicks does not necessarily change anything about establishing liabil-
ity in an individual disparate treatment case. Many litigators and judges
prior to Hicks read Burdine to mean that the plaintiff could meet his
burden of persuasion by disproving the employer's articulated nondis-
criminatory reason. After Hicks, trial courts and juries remain free to
find discrimination based on a prima facie case together with the suc-
cessful discrediting of the employer's alleged nondiscriminatory reason.
The difference is that this result no longer is required as a matter of
law. Plaintiffs' lawyers will be well advised to do more than merely
undermine the employer's reason, but even before Hicks, any additional
evidence of discrimination that was available was likely to be presented
to buttress the plaintiff's attempt to establish pretext.
Hicks makes a difference only if judges and juries accept the
Court's invitation to question the basic assumption and search for mo-
tives other than discrimination to explain the employer's actions. The
presumption attached to the prima facie case deprives juries and judges
of that opportunity. It represents a legal judgment that when a member
of a group protected by Title VII demonstrates that, although qualified,
she was the subject of an adverse employment decision, the plaintiff
has met her burden of proving discrimination. After Hicks, the same
evidence that establishes a prima facie case may now be judged insuf-
ficient by the judge or jury because they do not believe that women
and minorities are more likely than not to be subject to arbitrary and
discriminatory decisions by employers. And because factual decisions
are subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review, their conclusions
will be reversed only if no reasonable juror could find otherwise. The
impact of Hicks depends, therefore, on what reasonable judges, juries,
and members of this culture believe about the existence of discrimi-
nation in the workplace and perhaps in society in general.
III. QUESTIONING THE BASIC ASSUMPTION
Hicks is significant, not for its narrow legal holding, but for the
attitude underlying that holding. The majority and dissent argue about
[Vol. 26:997
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parsing precedent and legal niceties such as the meaning of a rebuttable
presumption and allocating burdens of proof. But this case is not about
who bears the burden of proof. Instead, this case is about what evi-
dence is sufficient to meet the plaintiff's burden of persuasion on dis-
criminatory intent. What evidence makes it "more likely than not" that
the defendant discriminated? The answer to this question depends on
one's beliefs about the prevalence of discrimination. Whether a reason-
able person (or judge) will be convinced that discrimination has been
shown depends on whether he believes that discrimination is a logical
inference in the absence of some other explanation for adverse conduct.
The district court and the majority of the Supreme Court in Hicks
reached their result, not because it was required by any formal legal
rules, but rather because they just plain do not believe in that basic
assumption. Unfortunately, the district court and the majority in Hicks
are not alone. Hicks represents the most recent and perhaps the most
prominent in a series of attacks on the basic assumption launched by
legal academics, commentators, and lower court judges.
A. Academic Questions
Professor Richard Epstein, in his book Forbidden Grounds: The
Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws, argues that in a free
market economy, discrimination is rare and unlikely. Epstein first
points out that employers who base employment decisions on their
belief that members of a particular group tend to be more qualified
than members of another group may be rational in their discriminatory
choices if their belief is statistically accurate.' For example, an em-
ployer who correctly believes that women as a group are weaker would,
over time, win by hiring only men. But, Epstein argues, employers will
be dissuaded from relying on group characteristics because they ordi-
narily will be able to do better by searching for the best qualified
members of each group:
[B]oth employers and employees have strong, if imperfect,
incentives to beat the statistical averages by engaging in search.
A decision not to trade with a given person cannot be made
lightly .... [P]eople who decide that they do not want to
28. RICHARD A. EPsmIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINsT EMFLoYEENT DIsc ,RI-
NATION LAWS (1992).
29. Id
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trade with or hire certain people because of race, sex, or age
are making a decision that has more than just external costs.
They bear a large part of the costs themselves, for their deci-
sion will surely limit their own opportunities for advancement
and success, even as it leaves others free to pursue alternate
opportunities. The greater the class of persons who are regarded
as off-limits, and the more irrational the preferences, the more
the decision will hurt the people who make it, and the more
numerous the options it will open to rival tfaders.
Professor Epstein then goes on to attack a number of studies which
purport to demonstrate that race and gender discrimination exist in both
employment and consumer markets.31 Epstein is not alone in suggest-
ing that discrimination is unlikely in an unregulated free market. In the
early 1960s, some economists opposed civil rights legislation on the
ground that it is unnecessary and counterproductive because unregulated
capitalism provides the best defense against discrimination.32
Economic analysts are not alone in their attack on the notion that
discrimination explains the adverse treatment of minority group mem-
bers and females. Professor Kingsley R. Browne questions the basic
assumption underlying the prima facie case in systemic disparate treat-
ment cases.33 Browne notes that in a systemic case based on inference,
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing statistically sig-
nificant disparities between the percentage of minority group members
in the employer's workforce and the percentage in the relevant labor
market. As the Supreme Court explained in International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. United States, "absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be
expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a
workforce more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composi-
tion of the population in the community from which employees are
hired." Conversely, absent discrimination, a substantial disparity is so
unlikely that it creates a prima facie case that discrimination has oc-
curred.
Professor Browne argues that the statistical prima facie case de-
30. Id. at 41-42.
31. Id. at 47-60.
32. See John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimina-
tion Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1583 (1992).
33. Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical Proof of Discrimination: Beyond "Damned Lies," 68
WASH. L. REv. 477 (1993).
34. 431 U.S. 324, 33940 n.28 (1977).
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pends on what he calls the "Central Assumption" that people of dif-
ferent races, genders, and ethnicity all possess the same interests and
abilities. This assumption is a necessary prerequisite to the assumption
that the workforce of the employer who does not discriminate will be
"more or less representative" of the population from which that
workforce is drawn. Browne asserts that it is unfair to impose on em-
ployers the burden of rebutting a statistically based prima facie case of
discrimination because the disparity may well result from differing in-
terests and abilities, not from discrimination.
Like Epstein and the majority in Hicks, Browne does not believe
that adverse treatment of minorities and females is more likely than not
to be the result of discrimination by employers. While Epstein argues
that employers have economic disincentives to discriminate against
qualified women and people of color, Browne goes further and explains
why, in the absence of discrimination, minorities and women are
underrepresented in the workplace. According to Browne, their inability
to compete may result from their lack of interest and ability rather than
from discrimination. It is unfair to infer discrimination from statistical
disparities because the "Central Assumption" that all groups are equally
interested and qualified and that statistical disparities more likely than
not suggest discrimination is just not true.
B. Judicial Skepticism
The notion that it is differences among the protected groups, rather
than discrimination, that explains disparities in the workplace also has
been accepted by some courts, especially the Seventh Circuit. In EEOC
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the EEOC challenged Sears' hiring and pro-
motion practices, alleging that Sears engaged in systemic disparate
treatment on the basis of gender, resulting in a concentration of women
in lower paying sales jobs in which they were compensated on an
hourly basis.3" Men, in contrast, were concentrated in higher paying
sales jobs in which compensation was based on commissions. The
EEOC presented evidence of significant gender disparities in Sears'
workforce. Although women accounted for sixty-one percent of the
applicants for sales jobs at Sears, only twenty-seven percent of the
newly hired commissioned sales staff was female. In contrast, seventy-
five percent of the hourly sales force were women.
35. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
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The Seventh Circuit in Sears agreed with the district court's conclu-
sion that these statistics did not prove discrimination. Sears had re-
sponded to the EEOC's statistical case by presenting evidence designed
to show that women were underrepresented, not because Sears discrimi-
nated, but rather because the female applicants were not interested in
commissioned sales jobs and because they were not as qualified as the
men. The Seventh Circuit described Sears' evidence:
The [district] court found that "[tihe most credible and convinc-
ing evidence offered at trial regarding women's interest in com-
mission sales at Sears was the detailed, uncontradicted testimo-
ny of numerous men and women who were Sears store manag-
ers, personnel managers and other officials, regarding their
efforts to recruit women into commission sales." These witness-
es testified . . . that women were generally more interested in
product lines like clothing, jewelry, and cosmetics that were
usually sold on a noncommission basis, than they were in prod-
uct lines involving commission selling like automotives, roofing,
and furnaces. The contrary applied to men. Women were also
less interested in outside sales which often required night calls
on customers than were men, with the exception of selling
custom draperies. Various reasons for women's lack of interest
in commission selling included a fear or dislike of what they
perceived as cut-throat competition, and increased pressure and
risk associated with commission sales. Noncommission selling,
on the other hand, was associated with more social contact and
friendship, less pressure and less risk. This evidence was con-
firmed by a study of national surveys and polls from the mid-
1930's through 1983 regarding the changing status of women in
American society, from which a Sears' expert made conclusions
regarding women's interest in commission selling; morale sur-
veys of Sears employees, which the court found "demonstrate[]
that noncommission saleswomen were generally happier with
their present jobs at Sears, and were much less likely that their
male counterparts to be interested in other positions, such as
commission sales"; a job interest survey taken at Sears in 1976;
a survey taken in 1982 of commission and noncommission
salespeople at Sears regarding their attitudes, interests, and the
personal beliefs and lifestyles of the employees, which the court
concluded showed that noncommission salesmen were "far more
interested" in commission sales than were noncommission sales-
[Vol. 26:9971012
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women ... and national labor force data.35
The EEOC presented an expert witness who testified that there are
"no significant differences between women and men regarding interests
and career aspirations. 37 The Seventh Circuit found no error in the
district court's conclusion that this evidence was "not credible, persua-
sive or probative." Agreeing with the district court, the appellate court
observed:,
These expert witnesses used small samples of women who had
taken traditional jobs when opportunities arose. Larger samples
would have been more persuasive. In addition as the court
found "[n]one of these witnesses had any specific knowledge of
Sears." . . . [T]he district court did not clearly err in finding
that women were not as interested in commission sales positions
as were men. 
3
Sears also presented evidence that female applicants were less quali-
fied than male applicants. The court concluded that "on average, female
applicants in the 'sales' pool were younger, less educated, less likely to
have commission sales experience, and less likely than male applicants
to have prior work experience with the products sold on commission at
Sears."
39
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the Sears opinion and Profes-
sor Browne's rejection of the assumption that discrimination explains
disparities in the workplace is that both Professor Browne and the Sev-
enth Circuit use stereotypes about women and racial minorities to rebut
the inference of discrimination. In this view, women and minorities are
underrepresented in the workplace, not because they are the subjects of
discrimination, but because they are lazy, not interested, unaggressive,
or unqualified.4 It is true that it would be difficult to disagree that
36. Il at 320-21 (quoting EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.. 628 F. Supp. 1264. 1306, 1310
(N.D. Ill. 1986)).
37. IL
38. Id. at 321-22 (quoting Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1314).
39. IA. at 322 (quoting Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1315).
40. The Seventh Circuit's tendency to ascribe workplace disparities to some explanation other
than discrimination is apparent in another case in which the court considered the legality of an
employer's reliance on word of mouth recruiting to secure a workforce. See EEOC v. Chicago
Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991). In Miniature Lamp Works. the court
rejected the disparate impact challenge against the company's word of mouth recruiting on a
variety of grounds, but in the process, the court made the following observation:
The trial court ignored Miniature's lack of a fluency requirement when considering
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members of the groups protected by Title VII are different from each
other in ways that are relevant to their employability. Consider Profes-
sor Douglas A. Laycock's remarks in Statistical Proof and Theories of
Discrimination:
[Teamsters] explicitly assumes that but for discrimination, the
employer's work force would in the long run mirror the racial
composition of the labor force from which it was hired. That
conclusion requires the further implicit assumption that the
black and white populations are substantially the same in all
relevant ways, so that any differences in result are attributable
to discrimination.
Some variation of that assumption is critical to all statistical
evidence of disparate treatment. It is a powerful and implausible
assumption: the two populations are assumed to be substantially
the same in their distribution of skills, aptitudes, and job prefer-
ences. Two hundred and fifty years of slavery, nearly a century
of Jim Crow, and a generation of less virulent discrimination
are assumed to have had no effect; the black and white popula-
tions are assumed to be substantially the same. All the differen-
tial socialization of little girls that feminists justifiably complain
about is assumed to have had no effect; the male and female
populations are assumed to be substantially the same.4t
With respect to comparing men and women, it is not even necessary to
cite the impact of discrimination and socialization to demonstrate differ-
ences. Women, on average, are physically shorter and weaker than men
and, insofar as height and strength are job prerequisites, women operate
the relative attractiveness of its jobs to different ethnic groups. Several Miniature
employees testified at trial that Miniature's position was one of only a few jobs open
to them because of their limited English fluency (these witnesses testified through an
interpreter). Common sense dictates that a nondiscriminatory employer with no English
fluency requirement will receive a disproportionate amount of applications from
non-English speaking persons.
Id. at 302-03. By asserting that a larger percentage of Hispanics and Asians (non-English speak-
ers) would be interested in Miniature's jobs due to their limited options, the employer seemed
to be attacking the assumption that a nondiscriminatory selection device will select employees in
proportion to their representation in the qualified labor market. Miniature did not seek to narrow
the labor market based on qualifications, but rather on disparate interest among the different
groups. While a higher or lower level of interest theoretically rebuts at least part of the infer-
ence of discrimination arising out of disparities in the employer's workforce, is it possible to
quantify the impact of differing interests among protected groups?
41. LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.. Autumn 1986, at 97, 98.
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at a disadvantage.
But what do these differences have to do with the inference of
discrimination arising out of substantial underrepresentation of women
and minorities in the workplace?4 2 A well-drafted statistical study
compares the percentage of protected group members in the employer's
workforce with the percentage of qualified protected group members in
the relevant labor market. Therefore, if women, for example, are less
qualified on average than men, they will constitute less than fifty per-
cent of the relevant labor market. The issue in Sears, however, primari-
ly concerned whether women were less interested than men in the com-
missioned sales jobs. In order for this, or any other, evidence of group
differences to be relevant to defeating an inference of discrimination
arising from statistical disparities, the evidence must be credible and
must account for all of the disparity between the relevant labor market
and the employer's workforce. Unless the evidence of group differences
explains all of the disparity, unexplained differences between the repre-
sentation of women in the workforce and in the relevant labor market
remain, giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
Putting aside the credibility issue for the moment, consider the
evidence presented in Sears. Even if the testimony in Sears is credible
that, on average, women prefer less challenging part-time positions that
do not require travel outside of the store, does this difference account
for all of the underrepresentation of women in commissioned sales
jobs?"3 If female preferences and qualifications account for only a
portion of the disparity, what accounts for the rest? Assuming that the
remaining disparity is statistically significant, the premise established in
42. Measurable group differences are relevant in disparate impact cases. Using a neutral em-
ployment criterion, such as height or strength, which has a disparate impact on member of a
protected group, such as women, violates Title VII unless the employer can demonstrate that the
criterion is job related and consistent with business necessity. This Article is confined, however.
to the question of proving intentional discrimination through inferences.
43. Consider Judge Cudahy's remarks dissenting from the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Sears.
Perhaps the most questionable aspect of the majority opinion is its acceptance of
women's alleged low interest and qualifications for commission selling as a complete
explanation for the huge statistical disparities favoring men. The adoption by the
district court and by the majority of Sears' analysis of these arguments strikes me as
extremely uncritical. Sears has indeed presented varied evidence that these gender-
based differences exist, both in our society as a whole and in its particular labor
pool. But it remains a virtually insuperable task to overcome the weight of the sta-
tistical evidence marshalled by the EEOC or the skepticism that courts ought to show
toward defenses to Title ViI actions that rely on unquantifiable traits ascribed to
protected groups.
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.. 839 F. Supp. at 360-61 (Cudahy. L. dissenting).
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Teamsters should apply-absent discrimination, the workforce should
mirror the population from which it is drawn. Sixty-one percent of the
applicants for Sears' sales positions were females. Only twenty-seven
percent of the newly hired commissioned sales personnel were females.
If Sears had established that only twenty-seven percent of the applicants
were female and interested, Sears would have accounted for all of the
disparity. But, what if forty percent of the applicants were "interested"
and qualified females? What accounts for the remaining disparity? The
court's opinion does not present Sears' evidence in terms of numbers.
Women are characterized as "generally" less interested in commissioned
sales jobs. How is it possible for this unquantified evidence to explain
all of the disparity and therefore rebut the inference of discrimination
raised by the EEOC's statistical case? The trial court in Sears acknowl-
edged the unquantified nature of the evidence:
Neither Ms. Brudney nor Dr. Rosenberg [Sears' expert witness-
es] contend that all women have these tendencies or preferenc-
es, and the court has not drawn any such inference from their
testimony. They have merely attempted to describe the overall
tendencies of many women. EEOC presented witnesses with
contrary views, whose testimony is discussed below. Suffice it
to say at this point that few sweeping generalities can be accu-
rately made about women (or men) overall in the workplace or
society. The court continually throughout trial exhorted witness-
es to quantify their generalizations by estimating some percent-
age of women with the interests or views being discussed. Few
witnesses were able to do so. The court therefore gave little
weight to much of the testimony generalizing about women in
the workforce from the actions of a few. However, the testimo-
ny of Ms. Brudney, although not based on a scientific study,
reflected actual views of women at Sears, and was corroborated
by the testimony of credible Sears' witnesses .... The testi-
mony of Dr. Rosenberg was also consistent with the experience
of Sears' managers and other personnel, and with other evi-
dence discussed below, and has also accordingly been given
some weight by the court."
The court's decision to reject the inference of discrimination is reminis-
cent of the decision in Hicks. Once Sears provided rebuttal evidence,
44. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1308 n.43 (N.D. III. 1986).
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the court dismissed the inference raised by the statistics and proceeded
as though it never existed even though Sears' evidence did not neces-
sarily explain all of the disparity. The court's eager rejection of the
inference suggests that it must not fully embrace the basic assumption
that absent explanation, significant disparities in the workforce indicate
discrimination.
There is, however, an even more disturbing aspect of Sears. The
court's willingness to credit Sears' evidence suggests that both Sears
and the court hold stereotypical views about the characteristics of fe-
male employees and provides further evidence that the court does not
believe in the existence of discrimination in the workplace. s The Sev-
enth Circuit seems eager to explain away the disparity without attribut-
ing it to discrimination. Evidence that disparities are the result of char-
acteristics of the alleged victims of discrimination, rather than the con-
duct of the employer, must be credible in order to rebut the inference
of discrimination arising from the disparities. Is the evidence in Sears
credible?
For example, the court was not so bold as to suggest that women
in society generally dislike commission sales, and yet the court conclud-
ed that women at Sears were not interested in the commission sales
positions despite their higher pay. 6 Even assuming that the court's
conclusion about women at Sears is correct, doesn't this necessarily
raise the question why the women at Sears differ from the general
population of women? Wouldn't it be reasonable to conclude that Sears
must in some way discourage applications from women who would
prefer commissioned sales jobs or that Sears describes those jobs in
ways that suggest that they are "male" jobs? In fact, the court found
that Sears' original Retail Testing Manual "describe[d] a commission
salesperson as a man who is 'active,' 'has a lot of drive,' possesses
45. I am not alone in this view. Judge Cudahy, dissenting from the Seventh Circuit opinion,
made the following remarks:
Women, as described by Sears, the district court and the majority. exhibit the
very same stereotypical qualities for which they have been assigned low-status posi-
tions throughout history ....
These conclusions, it seems to me. are of a piece with the position that women
are by nature happier cooking, doing the laundry and chauffeuring the children to
softball games than arguing appeals or selling stocks. The stereotype of women as
less greedy and daring than men is one that the sex discrimination laws were intend-
ed to address. It is disturbing that this sort of thinking is accepted so uncritically by
the district court and by the majority.
l at 361 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
46. Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1308 n.43.
19941
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
'considerable physical vigor,' 'likes work which requires physical ener-
gy,' etc. References to males were eliminated in the 1960s. The present
version is otherwise substantially similar in content to the original ver-
sion."'47
Sears' testing included questions designed to assess the applicants'
"vigor," which the EEOC alleged were likely to weed out or discourage
women: "Questions asked include: 'Do you have a low pitched voice?'
'Do you swear often?' 'Have you ever done any hunting?' 'Have you
played on a football team?"'48 The trial court dismissed any concerns
about the testing questions on the ground that, under Sears' affirmative
action plan, women were scored differently than men. But couldn't
questions like these suggest to women that management viewed com-
missioned sales jobs as male preserves?
If the women hired by Sears actually differ from the general popu-
lation, isn't it likely that Sears has done something discriminatory to
cause this situation?49 Perhaps Sears only hired women who tended to
prefer hourly sales jobs. Evidence concerning the interests of applicants
to Sears was derived, at least in part, by surveys conducted on individ-
uals already employed by Sears in hourly sales positions.5" Is it logical
to assume that Sears' current hourly employees and the applicants for
employment at Sears share the same interests? Perhaps the interests of
rejected applicants were different from those who were accepted, or
perhaps the women's experiences at Sears caused them to lose interest
in the higher paying commissioned sales positions. The court's unques-
tioning reliance on Sears' evidence regarding the interests of its em-
ployees fails to consider the company's possible responsibility for the
limited ambitions of its own female employees.
In another part of the trial court's opinion, the court chided the
EEOC's statistical expert for failing to account in his statistical analysis
for all factors relevant to an applicant's qualifications to work in com-
missioned sales:
47. Id. at 1300.
48. Id. at 1300 n.29.
49. Judge Cudahy, dissenting from the Seventh Circuit's opinion, commented: "Huge statisti-
cal disparities in participation in various commission selling jobs are ascribed to differences in
interest. Yet there is scarcely any recognition of the employer's role in shaping the interests of
applicants." Sears, 839 F.2d at 361 (Cudahy, J.. dissenting).
50. See Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1312 n.56 ("Although the surveys and testimony discussed
above relate primarily to the interests of women already employed by Sears, the court finds that
this evidence also provides a good indication of the interest of women applying for sales posi-
tions at Sears.").
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Other important factors not controlled for in EEOC's analy-
sis are those characteristics which could be determined only
from an interview, not from the written application. These in-
clude physical appearance, assertiveness, the ability to communi-
cate, friendliness, and economic motivation. Dr. Siskin admitted
that these are factors identified by Sears managers as desirable
for commission salespersons. However, no adjustment is made
for these factors in his analyses.5
Earlier in the opinion, the court described the interview process as a
series of open-ended questions and noted that:
No formal instruction was provided regarding the qualities to
look for in commission sales candidates. Interviewers were
expected to learn the desirable characteristics for commission
salespersons from observation of those persons presently selling
on commission, and from managers' guidance as to the types of
individuals who had been successful in the past.52
The EEOC expressed concern about the subjective nature of the inter-
view process and the opportunity it provided for interviewers to dis-
criminate on the basis of gender. Although the court was unpersuaded,
isn't it possible that the subjective interview process resulted in a
skewed workforce comprised predominantly of passive women who
prefer hourly sales jobs? The court's rejection of the EEOC's concerns
on this matter again suggests a tendency to reject the assumption that
discrimination explains disparities in the workplace absent an explana-
tion to the contrary. How can an interview process be nondiscriminatory
when it is wholly subjective and interviewers are expected to hire more
sales personnel like those who have been successful in the past (i.e.
men)? And how can the interview process be nondiscriminatory when
Sears' description of the commissioned sales job suggests stereotypically
male characteristics?
The trial court in Sears went on to credit "evidence of differences
in the general interests and attitudes of men and women in American
society over the past 50 years." s3 However, the court simultaneously
rejected general population and historical evidence presented by the
EEOC that minimized the differences between men and women with
51. Id at 1303.
52. Id at 1300.
53. Id at 1308.
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respect to work interests and aspirations on the ground that "[n]one of
[the EEOC's] witnesses had any specific knowledge of Sears, or provid-
ed any specific evidence to contradict the strong evidence presented by
Sears of the actual differences between the interests of men and women
in commission sales positions at Sears.' ' 4
Finally, the trial court's opinion in Sears evidences a tendency to
dismiss the EEOC's evidence of discrimination on the basis of inade-
quacies in the development and analysis of the data while at the same
time crediting Sears' testimony regarding the career interests of women,
even when the court recognized that the data was deficient in some
way. 55
In short, the Sears opinion questions the basic assumption that,
absent explanation, statistical disparities in the workforce prove discrim-
ination. First, the court allows unquantified evidence of female differ-
ences to rebut the entire disparity. Second, the court reaches to reject
the inference of discrimination and find evidence of female differences
credible, dismissing the possibility that Sears' discriminatory conduct
may have caused these differences and ignoring defects in Sears' evi-
dence and analysis. I am not persuaded. I fully recognize that as a pro-
fessional female who has consistently chosen high-paying and challeng-
ing career opportunities, I am inclined to manipulate evidence to fit my
view that discrimination, rather than female characteristics, explains the
underrepresentation of women in many areas of the economy, including
the commissioned sales positions at Sears. That fact, however, only
underscores my point that the sufficiency of evidence of discrimination
is substantially dependent on the outlook of the trier of fdct. Judges and
juries who view women and racial minorities in traditionally stereotypi-
cal ways and who are skeptical of the impact of discrimination on the
employment opportunities of these groups will be unlikely to infer dis-
54. Id. at 1314.
55. Compare id. at 1310 (crediting a study hurriedly conducted in anticipation of litigation:
"[T]he court finds that, although [Sears'] survey was not taken using ideal methods, none of the
problems cited by [EEOC] are significant enough to affect the essential validity of the results");
and id. at 1312 n.56 ("Although the surveys and testimony discussed above relate primarily to
the interests of women already employed by Sears, the court finds that this evidence also pro-
vides a good indication of the interest of women applying for sales positions at Sears."); and
id. at 1323 ("The court recognizes that, by normalizing scores, Sears may have undervalued the
interest of some female applicants in these product lines. Bearing this in mind, however, the
court finds that the results of Sears' analysis do provide probative evidence of relative lack of
interest."); with id. at 1316 ("Since EEOC did not properly control for interest or qualifications.
EEOC never compared these two groups. Without meaningful underlying comparisons in its
unadjusted and adjusted analyses, EEOC's values prove nothing.").
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crimination in the absence of clearly defined standards and presump-
tions which mandate a finding of discrimination when adverse treatment
or statistical disparities have not been explained.
Consider further that after Hicks, Sears probably would not be
reversed on appeal even if the trial court rejected Sears' explanation for
the disparities! In a systemic case, statistical disparities create a prima
facie case of discrimination, shifting the burden to the employer to
produce rebuttal evidence. After Hicks, it seems reasonable to conclude
that once the employer produces evidence which, if true, would rebut
the prima facie case, the judge is then free to weigh all the evidence
and reach a conclusion regarding the presence or absence of discrimina-
tion without being constrained by the presumption created by the prima
facie case.
The trend away from recognizing discrimination as the explanation
for workplace disparities takes another form in cases in which employ-
ers rely on subjective standards of evaluation to explain disparate treat-
ment of women or members of other groups protected by anti-discrimi-
nation laws. In early Title VII cases, courts tended to suspect discrimi-
nation when employers explained disparate treatment of minority group
members by reference to subjective standards of evaluating candidates
for employment or promotion in blue collar jobs.5  Courts reasoned
that subjective evaluations might not qualify as legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reasons because they could mask discrimination based on sub-
conscious stereotypes and prejudices. Studies have confirmed that identi-
cal work products may be evaluated differently depending on whether attrib-
uted to a male or a female.' Nonetheless, courts reviewing employers'
decisions in professional contexts have long recognized the business ne-
cessity of relying on subjective evaluations and have therefore tended to
defer to the employer's subjective judgment.58
56. See, e.g., Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 712 F.2d 1377 (1lth Cir. 1983) (holding
that statistical evidence, use of subjective hiring standards, and history of past racial discrimi-
nation are enough to compel finding of discrimination); Watson v. National Linen Serv, 686
F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1982) (failure to establish fixed or reasonably objective standards and proce-
dures for hiring is a discriminatory practice); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp.. 495 F.2d
437 (5th Cir. 1974) (employer discriminated against black employees by using a promotion
process that lacked clearly ascertainable job standards); EEOC v. H.S. Camp & Sons. Inc.. 542
F. Supp. 411 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (subjective promotion process taken together with under-
representation of minorities and women in supervisory positions establishes a strong case of dis-
crimination).
57. ZMmER, SuLuVAN, RICHARDS & CALLOwAY. supra note 25, at 99-101.
58. See, e.g., Kunda v. Muhlenberg College., 621 F.2d 532. 548 (3d Cir. 1980) (determina-
tions about such matters as teaching ability and research scholarship are subjective and should
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More recently, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank and Trust59 rejected the notion that subjective employment crite-
ria raise an inference of discriminatory intent:
It is true, to be sure, that an employer's policy of leaving pro-
motion decisions to the unchecked discretion of lower level
supervisors should itself raise no inference of discriminatory
conduct. Especially in relatively small businesses like
respondent's, it may be customary and quite reasonable simply
to delegate employment decisions to those employees who are
most familiar with the jobs to be filled and with the candidates
for those jobs.6
Although the Court recognized that subjective criteria may be used in a
discriminatory fashion,6' Watson nonetheless permits employers to rely
on subjective standards to rebut a prima facie case of individual dispa-
rate treatment. In Sears, the court went even further and discounted
evidence of systemic disparate treatment partially on the ground that the
statistical model failed to incorporate factors the employer looked for in
the interview process. Thus, the plaintiffs prima facie case was suspect
because it failed to incorporate factors which themselves may incorpo-
rate "subconscious stereotypes and prejudices." 62 In short, reasons
which themselves may be a proxy or a mask for discrimination are
permitted to rebut an inference of discrimination.
Hicks relies on a similarly suspect "nondiscriminatory" reason. The
district court in Hicks found that although Hicks had proven "the exis-
tence of a crusade to terminate him, he [had] not proven that the cru-
sade was racially rather than personally motivated."'63 In other words,
Hicks' supervisors just didn't like him. But doesn't that beg the ques-
tion? Why didn't they like him? When a black man is not liked, absent
evidence that he possesses undesirable characteristics peculiar to him,
be left for evaluation by professionals).
59. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
60. Id. at 990.
61. The Court stated:
It does not follow, however, that the particular supervisors to whom this discretion is
delegated always act without discriminatory intent. Furthermore, even if one assumed
that any such discrimination can be adequately policed through disparate treatment
analysis, the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain.
Id.
62. Id.
63. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
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isn't it more likely than not that the source of the dislike is his race?
While discrimination is motivated by a variety of emotions and stereo-
typical assumptions, isn't hate one of the typical attributes of race dis-
crimination? Some defendants have argued that a sexual harassment
case should be rebutted by evidence that the defendant didn't harass
women as a group, but rather had a particular attraction for the plain-
tiff-he harassed her because he liked her.6' But isn't sexual attraction
to an individual of the opposite sex a fundamental attribute of hostile
environment gender discrimination? Isn't it more likely than not (as-
suming that the harasser is not a homosexual) that he was attracted to
her because of attributes that included her gender?
C. Societal Attitudes
The Supreme Court in Hicks questions the assumption that unex-
plained adverse treatment of minority group members more likely than
not results from intentional discrimination. Professor Epstein argues that
the market economy renders anti-discrimination laws unnecessary. Pro-
fessor Browne and the Sears majority question the "Central Assump-
tion" that all groups are equally interested and qualified and that statis-
tical disparities more likely than not suggest discrimination. The subjec-
tive criteria cases characterize as "nondiscriminatory" criteria and rea-
sons which themselves may be discriminatory. Some academics and
judges don't seem to believe that discrimination exists. If this attitude is
widely shared, Hicks will make it substantially more difficulty for plain-
tiffs to prove discrimination.
However, the 1991 amendments to Title VII provide for jury trials
to resolve allegations of discrimination in violation of Title VII. The
impact of Hicks on future disparate treatment cases, therefore, will
depend not only on the attitudes of judges, but also on the attitudes of
juries drawn from the general population. What does the general public
believe about discrimination? Opinion polls indicate that white Ameri-
cans tend to believe either that discrimination in employment is a thing
of the past or that affirmative action plans mean that minority group
members actually have an advantage in the workplace:
64. See Babcock v. Frank. 729 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (defendant argued that harass-
ment did not violate Title VII because it was based on a prior sexual relationship. not on gen-
der), compl dismissed, 783 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); cf. DeCintio v. Westchester County
Medical Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986) (plaintiffs "were not prejudiced bLcause of their
status as males; rather, they were discriminated against because Ryan preferred his paramour."}.
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"It could be the whole notion of equal opportunity has
changed," said Patrick Gilbert of the International Research
Corp., a Chicago company that has just completed a two-year
survey measuring attitudes of 28,573 employees of 12 major
corporations. "Many now think equal opportunity does not
mean affirmative action. There is a general reaction among
(whites) that too much accommodation has been made." . . . In
a 1990 survey of 1,362 people ... about 64 percent of the
respondents said it was very likely or somewhat likely that a
white person won't get a job or promotion while an equally or
less qualified black person does. Only 34 percent said it was
not very likely.
Other more recent polls ... also have shown hardening
attitudes toward affirmative action. A December [1991] Wash-
ington Post-ABC News national poll of 1,000 people indicated,
for example, that 66 percent of the respondents were worried to
some degree that affirmative action may have gone too far to
give some blacks unfair advantages over whites. Thirty-two
percent said they were worried not at all. 5
Another 1990 survey reported that while whites no longer fear that
they will be disadvantaged by affirmative action, they believe that dis-
crimination in employment does not exist:
Asked to consider a situation in which a black and white per-
son of equal intelligence and skill applied for the same job, a
plurality of whites in 1978 feared reverse discrimination - they
said the black would get the job; today the dominant answer is
that both would have an equal chance.6
Even blacks believe that discrimination in the workplace is on the
decline:
The shift in outlook among blacks is ... dramatic: Only a
third now think [an equally qualified] white person would have
the better chance of being hired, down from half. Four in 10
blacks - twice as many as 12 years ago - say both candidates
65. Dele Olojede, Affirmative Action Hostility Grows as Economy Shrinks. HOUSTON CHRON.,
Feb. 2, 1992, at A16.
66. Bums W. Roper, Race Relations in America. CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, July 13, 1990, at
18.
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would have an equal chance.6
Reports in the media also sometimes suggest that discrimination has
substantially disappeared:
No longer is there the virulent anti-Catholicism that pervaded
much of America, even at the time of John F. Kennedy's cam-
paign for president. Diminished, but not gone, is the personal
and institutional racism that afflicted blacks for centuries, whose
undoing necessitated a social revolution that is still in progress.
Buried in history are the Franco-, Hispano-, and
Germano-phobias about attempts to undermine or destroy the
country. Meliorism rather than retrogression characterizes Amer-
ican intergroup relations.
If discrimination in employment has substantially decreased since
Title VII was enacted, then perhaps it is appropriate for judges and
juries to view claims of individual or systemic disparate treatment with
skepticism. Other evidence suggests, however, that reports of the death
of discrimination and stereotypical attitudes are greatly exaggerated. If
that is the case, Hicks has done a great injustice by inviting lower
courts and juries to question the basic assumption that, absent explana-
tion, adverse treatment of women and minority group members is more
likely than not discriminatory.
IV. THE BASIC ASSUMPTION AND THE REAL WORLD:
DISCRIMINATION PERSISTS
It is unnecessary to look any further than the materials already
discussed to find evidence that stereotypical attitudes persist. While it is
true that anti-discrimination laws prohibit discriminatory conduct, not
prejudice or stereotypes, much discriminatory conduct is based on ste-
reotypical attitudes about the characteristics and qualifications of women
and minorities.
Consider first Justice Scalia's opinion in Hicks in which the cham-
pion of color blind thinking provides us with evidence that none of us
are immune from stereotyping. Remember that in his opinion in Hicks,
Justice Scalia stated that when a decision maker is the same race as the
plaintiff, this is compelling evidence that the challenged adverse action
67. Id
68. Philip Perlmutter, The Ebbing of Etdnic Bias, CHRISTtAN SC. MO.rro&. March 2. 1989,
at 19.
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was not the result of discrimination. Given Justice Scalia's insistence on
color blind thinking in affirmative action cases, his color conscious
remarks in Hicks might be amusing except that they provide an invita-
tion to lower court judges and juries to rebut the inference of discrimi-
nation by drawing stereotypical conclusions about the thought processes
of employers based on their race. In short, judges are being invited to
discriminate in order to infer the absence of discrimination. The infer-
ence of discrimination arising out of the prima facie case is based on
the identity of the victim, not on the identity of the employer. Inferring
discrimination on the basis of the race or gender of the employer is the
essence of discrimination-treating similarly situated individuals differ-
ently based on their race or gender.
Professor Epstein also holds stereotypical views about race and
gender. After arguing that a free market system discourages discrim-
ination, Epstein contends that some discrimination is rational and effi-
cient and therefore desirable. His argument depends in part on the
stereotypical assumption that individuals of the same race or gender
share interests and therefore are likely to work more harmoniously
together:
[A]ssume for the moment that all workers have identical prefer-
ences on all matters relevant to the employment relation. If the
question is whether or not they wish to have music piped into a
common work area, they all want music. If the question is what
kind of music they wish to hear, the answer is classi-
cal-indeed, mostly Mozart. If the question is how loud, the
agreement is perfect down to the exact decibel. In this employ-
ment utopia, decisions of collective governance are easy to
make. The employer who satisfies preferences of any single
worker knows that he or she has satisfied the preferences of the
entire work force. It takes little effort and little money to
achieve the highest level of group satisfaction . ...
The situation is quite different once it is assumed that there
is no employee homogeneity in taste within the workplace ....
[A]s the tastes within the group start to diverge, it becomes
harder to reach a decision that works for the common good. If
half the workers crave classical music but loath rock, and half
like rock but disdain classical music, it is very difficult to de-
cide whether music shall be played in the workplace at all, and
if so what kind. The wider the variation in taste, the more
troublesome these collective decisions are . ...
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.. The increase in harmony of tastes and preferences thus
works in the long-run interest of all members. To the extent,
therefore, that individual tastes are grouped by race, by sex, by
age, by national origin-and to some extent they are-then
there is a necessary conflict between the commands of any
antidiscrimination law and the smooth operation of the firm.
Firms whose members have diverse and clashing views may
well find it more difficult to make collective decisions than
firms with a closer agreement over tastes ....
... [V]oluntary sorting can reduce the costs of making
and enforcing group decisions. It remains to be noted that this
sorting often takes place on racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual
lines .... [For example,] [w]orkers may prefer to sort them-
selves out by language . ... Indeed, it seems quite possible
that there are variations within the English language that make
communication easier between blacks and other blacks than
between blacks and whites ....
The commonality of preferences may extend beyond lan-
guage to other features of collective life: the music played in
the workplace, the food that is brought in for lunch, the holi-
days on which the business is closed down, the banter around
the coffeepot, the places chosen for firm outings, and a thou-
sand other small details that contribute to the efficiency of the
firm.69
The appropriate first reaction to Professor Epstein's argument is
sympathy for someone whose "employment utopia" is a place that is
populated entirely with individuals who have identical characteristics
and interests. The second reaction could be amusement at Epstein's
euphemism for discrimination ("voluntary sorting") except that discrimi-
nation is abhorrent no matter how you describe it. The third reaction
ought to be astonishment that someone so educated and privileged
could entertain such narrow-minded views and stereotypical notions
about the relationship between group membership and interests, habits
and beliefs. But that is exactly why Professor Epstein's views and those
of Justice Scalia mean so much. Even educated and otherwise decent
individuals hold unfounded stereotypical views about race and gender.
Of course Title VII prohibits acting on one's prejudices rather than the
prejudices themselves. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized
69. EPSTFIN, supra note 28, at 61-68.
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that stereotyping is direct evidence of discrimination, 0 and stereotyp-
ing frequently motivates discriminatory conduct. If Justice Scalia and
Professor Epstein were alone in their views, aggressive application of
the anti-discrimination laws would perhaps be unnecessary. Unfortunate-
ly, negative stereotyping is practiced by many Americans.
A recent survey of young Americans, aged fifteen to twenty-five,
revealed persistent stereotypical attitudes on race: "Across racial lines,
young Americans are deeply pessimistic about their future and, as the
economy worsens, tend to believe the worst about other races, accord-
ing to new national study ....,, Consider some of the key findings
reported from the 190-page study:
Many whites still cling to ugly stereotypes and, in inter-
views, characterized minorities as lazy, welfare-dependent crimi-
nals.
The best-educated young blacks were among the most cyni-
cal about white America's commitment to the elimination of
prejudice ....
One of the most divisive issues . . was the question of
who most often gets the short end of the stick in scholarships,
employment and promotions. Regardless of race, the majority of
youths questioned see themselves as victims of discrimina-
tion ....
About half of the whites surveyed believe they lose out to
minorities because of special considerations. And more than half
of the Hispanics and 68 percent of the blacks surveyed believe
they are denied opportunities because of racial prejudice.72
Because this study questioned young people, it is particularly trou-
bling. Although this group has enjoyed more extensive interracial con-
tact than older Americans, most of the youth who were questioned
apparently have not learned to extend positive feelings about individuals
of other races to the group as a whole. According to Susan Fiske, a
psychology professor at the University of Massachusetts who specializes
70. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
71. Cynthia Durcanin, Young People Paint Bleak Picture of U.S. Race Relations, Survey
Says, ATLANTA J. & CONST., March 17, 1992. at A4 (discussing the results of a survey con-
ducted by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, which questioned 295 blacks, 709 whites, 122
Hispanics, and 44 "others," including Asians. The survey had a margin of error of plus or mi-
nus four percentage points.).
72. Id.
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in the study of stereotypes, "[ylou can't just put people together in a
room or at school and expect them to break down their stereo-
types .... People are more complicated than that."
Other national opinion polls have concluded that even though
whites support equal employment opportunity in the abstract, they view
blacks as a group negatively. For example, sixty-two percent of whites
consider blacks to be less hard working than whites.74 Negative and
stereotypical attitudes are not limited to African Americans.
Many Americans appear to [hold a] negative view of Latinos.
In 1990, the National Opinion Research Center reported that,
compared to Jews, Blacks, Asians, southern whites and whites
in general, Americans perceive Latinos as second only to Blacks
as being lazy and living off welfare rather than being
self-supporting, and see Latinos as the least patriotic of all these
groups.75
Other studies have demonstrated that, although many whites believe
that affirmative action has provided hiring advantages to racial minori-
ties, in reality, discrimination continues to create arbitrary barriers to
equal employment opportunity for blacks. In 1991, the Urban Institute
published the results of a study in which researchers randomly selected
newspaper advertisements for job vacancies and then sent matched pairs
of black and white "auditors" to apply for the jobs:
The hiring audits were conducted by [ten] pairs of full-time,
paid auditors, [five] pairs in each of the two audit sites. Careful
recruitment, matching and training of auditors was integral to
the success of the study. The auditors, one black and one white,
were carefully matched to control for all "job relevant" charac-
teristics. Specifically, these were experience, education, age, and
physical strength and size. Audit partners were made identical
in a defined set of job qualifications and trained so that other
attributes-demeanor, openness, articulateness, and energy lev-
el-were as similar as possible. Race was the only important
difference between the two members of each audit team.76
73. d
74. See David B. Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination. 141 U. PA. L REV. 899. 908-09
(1993).
75. Rodolfo 0. de La Garza, et al., Hispanic Americans in the Mainstream of US. Politics.
PuBaLc PERsp., July-Aug. 1992, at 19 (citing TOM SMinf. NATIONAL OPINtO RMSEARc CEN-
TE, ETHNIC SURvEY: GSS TOPICAL REPORT NutiBER 19 (1990)).
76. MARGARET A. TURNFR Er AL, OPPORTUNTnEs DENIED. OPPORTUNTtEs DLwmIsIIED:
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The results of this study confirmed the persistence of racial discrimina-
tion:
A total of 476 hiring audits were conducted in the metropolitan
areas of Washington, D.C., and Chicago during the summer of
1990. In one out of five audits, the white applicant was able to
advance farther through the hiring process than his equally
qualified black counterpart. In other words, the white was able
to either submit an application, receive a formal interview, or
be offered a job when the black was not. Overall, in one out of
seven, or 15 percent, of the audits, the white was offered a job
although his equally qualified black partner was not.
In contrast, black auditors advanced farther than their white
counterparts on only 7 percent of the audits, and the black
auditors received job offers whereas their white partners did not
in 5 percent of the audits. In sum, if equally qualified black
and white candidates are competing for a job, differential treat-
ment, when it occurs, is three times more likely to favor the
white applicant than the black.77
The Institute reported that these results are "significant at the 99
percent confidence level.""8 Because the results were based on posi-
tions advertised in newspapers rather than in employment agencies
where there are more opportunities for discrimination,79 the authors of
the report speculated that their results underrepresented the problem of
discrimination. The authors believed that the study also may have
underreported discrimination because
all of the auditors participating in this study were actually col-
lege students who were overqualified for the positions for which
DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING 24-25 (1991).
77. Id. at 62-63.
78. Id. at 66 n.2.
79. For example, four New York employment agencies recently were charged with using
code words to discriminate on the basis of age and race:
Personnel counselors at the agencies typically used code words like "six" to indicate
a black applicant, "half-six" to describe male Hispanic applicants, and several other
catch phrases to describe other applicants. Older applicants were classified by one
agency with the phrase, "too much mileage." In some cases, employers conveyed the
message to the agencies that white applicants were preferred with classifications like
"all-American," "front-office appearance," "mom and applepie" and "corporate image."
Craig Wolf, New York Sues Job Agencies in Bias Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1989, at BI-B2.
See also U.S. Official Accuses 2 Companies of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1989, at A16.
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they applied; they were articulate and poised, spoke and dressed
conventionally, and posed as having prior job experience. One
would expect both blacks and whites with these characteristics
to appear as exceptionally attractive candidates to prospective
employers. In particular, the qualifications of the black auditors
were substantially higher than those of the average black appli-
cant for entry-level jobs."0
In another study of discrimination against Hispanics in Chicago and San
Diego, the Institute found similar results.8
Unfortunately, discrimination on the basis of gender and race in this
country is not limited to holding stereotypical attitudes and acting on
them in denying employment opportunities. The ugliest evidence of
continued discriminatory attitudes in this country comes in the form of
actual and threatened racially and sexually motivated violence. A sense
of the dimensions of the problem can be derived by merely searching
the NEXIS file of current materials for the terms "racial violence" or
"skinheads" and having the search stop because more than 1000 entries
will be retrieved. Narrowing the search further yields nearly 900 arti-
cles. Perusing them gives a sense of just how much bigotry and racial
violence exists in this country.
In 1982, Vincent Chin, a Chinese-American draughtsman, out cele-
brating on the eve of his wedding, "was murdered by two out-of-work
white car factory workers from Detroit, who blamed the Japanese for
their ills."' 2 In December 1990, the Los Angeles Times reported a
"rash of. . . violence against Japanese in the United States," including
a cross-burning at a Japanese school in Tennessee, pickets waving signs
saying "Jap Go Home" in front of a Nissan auto plant, "[w]hite su-
premacists beat[ing] up Japanese students in Colorado," and patrons at a
California bar roughing up three Japanese women while yelling, "Speak
English. 83 More recently, in May 1993,
Yoshihiro Hattori, 16, a Japanese exchange student in Louisi-
ana ... was killed with a .44 Magnum when he stopped at the
wrong house looking for a Halloween party to which he had
80. TURNER, supra note 76, at 63.
81. Id. at 63-64.
82. Lee Slew Hua, Asian-Americans: Eternal Foreigners?, THE STArrs T.IES. Sept. 6. 1992.
at 1-2; Penelope McMillan, Killing That Galvanized Asian.Americans Recalled. LA. TmIES. June
23, 1992, at B3.
83. Teresa Watanabe, Like an Old War Wound. LA. TiES. Dec. 6. 1991. at Al.
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been invited. What has shocked the Japanese . . .was the quick
acquittal of the homeowner, Rodney Peairs, by a Baton Rouge
jury, which found it was not a crime to kill someone who
comes to the door without even asking a question. 4
In New York, "[o]n May 28, 1986, at 4 A.M. in Coney Island, four
white men, using a knife and bat, killed Samuel Spencer 3d, an un-
armed 19-year-old black man."8" Spencer's killers were convicted of
murder. In a subsequent civil suit, a jury found that the attack had been
racially motivated. 6 Later in 1986, in another racist attack "in the
Howard Beach section of New York... a bunch of young white men
chased a black man, Michael Griffith, onto a highway, where he was
struck by a car and killed.8 7 On August 23, 1989, Usef Hawkins, a
young black man going to visit a white girl in the Bensonhurst area of
New York was "lynched by a white gang" in a racially motivated at-
tack.88 In 1991, Yankel Rosenbaum, a Hasidic scholar, was stabbed to
death in racial violence in the Crown Heights section of Brooklyn, New
York. 9
In Los Angeles in April 1992, Reginald Denny, a white truck driv-
er, was beaten in a racially motivated attack following the verdict ac-
quitting four white police officers of using excessive force in the beat-
ing of black motorist Rodney King a year earlier.90 In Connecticut in
October 1993, swatztikas and anti-Jewish threats and epithets were
spray-painted on synagogues and a school and on the home of the
Jewish candidate for mayor of West Hartford. In addition, racist graffiti
was found on an AME Zion church in Manchester. 9' In October 1993,
a fight in which three white teenagers were stabbed in Charlestown,
Massachusetts "touched off a week of racial unrest that included a cross
burning and a Molotov cocktail left outside a Hispanic resident's
84. Joan Beck, The Ugly American Is Being Displaced by the Deadly American,. CHI. TRIB,
May 27, 1993, at 31.
85. Michael Winerip, Slain for Race: It's Now Official After 6 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
1992, at 37.
86. Id.
87. Richard Cohen, Balkan Justice in LA, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1993, at A17.
88. Nicholas Stix, Offering: A Share of Bensonhurst, NEWSDAY, Oct. 2, 1992, at 56.
89. Michael Wines, Slain Hasid's Brother Says Reno Lags on Crown His., N.Y. TIMES. Oct.
29, 1993, at B4.
90. To Hell and Back, PEOPLE MAG., Dec. 28, 1992 at 135-36; Cohen, supra note 87. at
A17.
91. Steven G. Vegh, Racist, Anti-Semitic Incidents Prompt Response, HARTFORD COURANT,
Oct. 30, 1993, at B2.
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home."'92 In September 1993, "[a] Florida jury convicted two white
drifters ... of abducting Christopher Wilson, a black man from Brook-
lyn, robbing him and setting him on fire .... The assailants showered
him with racial epithets and laughed as he burned." 93 On July 25,
1993, the Sacramento Bee listed forty-six news items reported nation-
wide during the month of June 1993 that related to discriminatory hate
or violence.94
While these apparently spontaneous racial attacks are distressing, the
growth of organizations whose purpose is to spread racial hate and
promote violence against racial minorities is even more frightening:
Representatives of three national watchdog organizations
[have] said the number of white supremacist groups in the
country is rising. Such groups are active in 40 states, compared
with 12 states just five years ago, said Barbara Bergen of the
Anti-Defamation League in Los Angeles.
Of the 25,000 or so people who belong to white suprema-
cist organizations in the United States, only about 200 are be-
lieved to be active in California.
"On the face of it, those numbers might not seem very
impressive," Bergen said. "But we cannot underestimate the
propensity for violence of these groups."
Since 1988, she said, 22 killings around the country have
been attributed to skinhead gangs.95
On October 7, 1993, three members of the Ku Klux Klan were
indicted for participating in a racially motivated attack on a black cou-
ple in South Bend, Indiana. The indictment stated that
on the night of April 17, 1992, after discussing their hatred of
African-Americans, the four men attempted to break into the
home of Michael McDaniels and Angela Blackwell, an
African-American couple in South Bend. According to the in-
dictment, the four yelled racial slurs and threats at the couple
and an infant in their care, kicked and beat on the door of the
92. Betsy Q.M. Tong, A Message of Peace Sent from Charlestown. BOSTOMN GLOB., Oct. 25.
1993, at 22.
93. Retrial Sought in Burning, WASH. POST, Sept. 19. 1993, at A16; Two Crimes. 36 Years
Apart, VASH. POST, September 11, 1993. at A20.
94. A Month of Rancor, SACRAMENTO BEF, July 25. 1993, at A14.
95. Cynthia Hubert, Spree of Hate Tied to Feeble Economy, SACRAMEWNTO BEF., Oct. 6. 1993.
at Al.
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couple's residence, and broke a window. The indictment further
state[d] that during the assault, the four had in their possession
a sawed-off shotgun which was fired at the door of the couple's
home.96
In August 1993, federal authorities reported that an outbreak of
racial violence on the West Coast appeared to be part of a white su-
premacist plot to begin a race war:
Federal authorities believe recent bomb attacks against Jews,
gays and blacks in California and Washington state may be part
of a white supremacist campaign to incite racial violence on the
West Coast. The FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms are stepping up investigations of white supremacist
groups in California, Oregon, Washington and Florida, officials
say.
Law-enforcement officials are looking into whether a recent
wave of attacks along the Pacific Coast was connected to an
alleged plot broken up by authorities last month to bomb a
prominent Los Angeles African-American church and
machine-gun its congregation. U.S. Atty. Mike Yamaguchi said
federal agents investigating the July 20 bombing of a NAACP
office in Tacoma, Wash., found documents suggesting white
supremacist groups have embarked on a racial terror campaign.
"We believe there was a larger conspiracy to incite riots,
racial tension and terrorism up and down the West Coast,"
Yamaguchi said Thursday in San Jose, Calif.
Besides the Tacoma attack, white supremacists are believed
responsible for the July 20 bombing of a gay bar in Seattle and
the firebombings of an NAACP office and a Jewish temple in
Sacramento later that month. No one was injured in any of the
attacks.
Suspected groups preach a doctrine of racial purity and
hatred similar to that of Jonathan Haynes, the California man
charged with murdering Wilmette plastic surgeon Martin
Sullivan last week ....
No arrests have been made in the Sacramento and Seattle
bombings. Eight reputed white supremacists were arrested in the
96. Grand Jury Indicts Alleged Klansmen for Assaulting Black Couple, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct.
12, 1993.
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alleged Los Angeles plot last month ....
Authorities said the firebombing was part of a larger plot to
attack Jewish synagogues and agencies, black institutions, U.S.
military installations, gay gathering places and radio and televi-
sion stations.
In addition, the alleged plot targeted for assassination black
rap music stars Ice-T and Ice Cube, officials said. Authorities
are trying to determine whether the attacks involve known white
supremacy organizations, specifically the American Front, based
in Portland, Ore.; the White Aryan Resistance, based in San
Diego; and the Church of the Creator, based in Niceville, Fla.
The groups have denied any role in the incidents.
"We're finding there are a lot of these people around," said
one federal investigator, referring to skinheads and other white
supremacists. "Whether they're coordinating their activities may
be a different matter....
"This is a national problem," said Rick Smith, spokesman
for the FBI in San Francisco. "This isn't just rhetoric. There are
people out there doing things. 97
The foregoing report of discriminatory attitudes and stereotyping,
discrimination in the workplace, and incidents of racial and ethnic vio-
lence in America is hardly complete. It is merely a representative sam-
ple of surveys, studies, and incidents that have taken place in the past
few years. It does not address the problem of police brutality against
racial minorities. Nor does it document domestic violence, rape, and
sexual harassment against women. In addition, it fails to chronicle the
subtle and persistent forms of discrimination encountered by women and
minority group members in their day-to-day existence." Even recog-
97. George de Lama, FBI: Racial Terror Plot Is Genuine. Ct. TRIB.. Aug. 15, 1993. at 8.
See Morris Dees, Young, Gullible and Taught to Hate, N.Y. TIES, Aug. 25. 1993, at AI5
Seth Mydans, Man Found Guilty of Selling Arms to Groups of White Supremacists, N.Y. TBLES,
Oct. 2, 1993, at 9; Jun Newton, Skinhead Suspects Admit to Bombings. Court Is Told. L.A.
TmmS, Sept. 8, 1993, at Al; Wayne Wurzer & Kery Murakazni, Skinhead Battle Cry Loud.
Muddled-Ideologies, Allegiances Shift, but Instances of Harassment Increasing, SEATTiLE TIutES,
Aug. 22, 1993, at BI.
98. See Robin D. Barnes. Standing Guard for the P.C. Militia, or. Fighting Hatred and
Indifference: Some Thoughts on Epressive Hate-Conduct and Political Correctness, 1992 U. ILL_
L REV. 979, 988-89 (1993) (describing racist incidents experienced by black students on college
campuses); see generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WEL"U THE PEuMA-
NENCE OF RACISM (1992); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
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nizing that attitudes do not necessarily result in conduct, and that many
individuals who participate in racial and ethnic violence are unlikely to
be in positions of authority that allow them to engage in employment
discrimination, the attitudes and behavior chronicled here provide evi-
dence of a society in which discrimination is endemic. Rejecting the
basic assumption that unexplained adverse conduct towards women and
minorities is the result of discrimination denies the continued existence
of discrimination itself. Denying the continued existence of discrimina-
tion is analogous to denying, in the 1950s, that the separate schools
maintained for black children were unequal, or denying, today, that the
Holocaust ever occurred.
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Hicks, academics, judges, and the general
public are questioning whether, after nearly thirty years of anti-discrimi-
nation legislation, discrimination persists. They are questioning the basic
assumption that absent explanation, adverse treatment of statutorily
protected groups is more likely than not the result of discrimination. If
they were right it would be cause for celebration. Unfortunately, al-
though the condition of women and minorities in the United States has
improved, and a significant majority of the public claims to believe in
equal employment opportunity, the overwhelming evidence indicates that
discrimination persists, and the basic assumption continues to warrant
judicial acceptance.
Fully recognizing that race- and gender-based violence is the work
of a twisted minority of the population, we all need to face the truth
that every American holds and regularly acts upon stereotypical assump-
tions based on group membership. When a woman walks down the
street at night and sees a young man approaching her she becomes
uncomfortable and concerned for her safety. She judges him, not on his
individual characteristics, but on his age and his gender. When a police
officer sees a white man driving in a predominantly black or Hispanic
city neighborhood, he wonders whether the individual is seeking to
purchase sex or drugs. He judges the man, not by his individual charac-
teristics, but by his race and gender. When a construction foreman takes
an application from a female seeking work, he wonders if she will be
strong enough and skilled enough to succeed. He judges her, not by her
individual characteristics, but by her gender. The examples could go on
and on. Every one of us can think of a time when we have judged
someone and acted on the basis of their group membership, not their
individual characteristics. That is what discrimination is all about.
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QUFSTIONING THE BASIC ASSUMPTION
Congress enacted Title VII in order to provide a statutory basis on
which victims of discrimination could seek redress. Congress has
amended Title VII on a regular basis to further strengthen its prohibi-
tions and to prevent the Supreme Court's narrow reading of the statute
from undermining its purpose. The ink is barely dry on the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, which amended Title VII to reverse the Court's attempt to
limit the application of disparate impact liability. 9 With Hicks, the
Court has launched an attack on the most basic form of discrimina-
tion-disparate treatment. Disparate treatment provided the primary
motivation for the original enactment of Title VII and other anti-dis-
crimination legislation.
Hicks' restriction on the impact of the prima facie case and its
questioning of the basic assumption, while consistent with the letter of
the law, is clearly at odds with its purpose. A presumption is a judicial-
ly or legislatively created mechanism for predetermining the sufficiency
of evidence to support a factual or legal conclusion. It saves time and
legal resources, but it also can serve the purpose of forcing a correct
decision that courts and juries are likely not to reach because of their
personal prejudices and biases. Inferring discrimination is just such a
situation and warrants exactly that treatment. Discrimination is rampant,
but judges, academics and laypersons alike either underestimate its
prevalence or believe that their group and not other groups are victim-
ized. Under these circumstances, in a world in which most people are
smart enough to avoid providing direct evidence of discriminatory in-
tent, it is critical for the law to define a prima facie case which creates
a presumption of discrimination absent evidence to the contrary.
The Hicks opinion is legal jargon that dances around the basic
issue. The prima facie case itself alters the burden of proof in exactly
the same way that Justice Scalia said the burden of proof would be
altered if the Court ruled in favor of Hicks. Three elements of the
prima facie case require the plaintiff to disprove potential legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons. In a case alleging discriminatory failure to
hire, the plaintiff must prove that he or she applied for a position.
Failure to apply would provide the employer with a legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff. Next, the plaintiff must
prove that he or she was qualified for the position. If the plaintiff did
not possess the minimum qualifications for the job, that would give the
99. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
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employer another legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring him
or her. Third, the plaintiff must prove that the position remained open.
If the position was'eliminated after it was advertised, that would consti-
tute a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff. In
short, if the plaintiff meets the burden of disproving these three legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reasons, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment in
his or her favor, absent some other explanation by the defendant. In
Hicks, the plaintiff disproved the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
articulated by the defendant. There is absolutely no reason why the
Court could not have defined the prima facie case and the operation of
presumptions in disparate treatment cases to provide that disproving the
defendant's articulated nondiscriminatory reason, together with proving a
prima facie case, creates a presumption that discrimination has occurred.
Nothing in the law of evidence or Title VII stands in the way of reach-
ing this result.
Failing to define proof of discrimination in this way denies the
prevalence of discrimination in this society and unfairly burdens plain-
tiffs seeking to prove discrimination by inference. Defining proof of
discrimination in this way does not unfairly burden employers. All they
are required to do is articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for their
conduct with respect to the defendant. They are not required to prove
that they were, in fact, motivated by the proffered reason. Title VII was
enacted out of concern for the victims of discrimination. Hicks, while
consistent with the precise wording of Title VII, places too high a
barrier in the way of plaintiffs seeking redress because, although dis-
crimination continues to persist in this society, belief in its continued
existence is eroding.
Congress's central concern in enacting Title VII was to bring an
end to intentional discrimination. Congress should ensure the continued
vitality of Title VII as an attack on intentional discrimination by
amending Title VII (again) to tell the Court (again) that it misunder-
stands Title VI's commitment to eradicate discrimination. Congress
should amend Title VII to create a statutory presumption mandating an
inference of discrimination whenever the plaintiff both establishes a
prima facie case and proves by the preponderance of the evidence that
the nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the employer did not moti-
vate the employer's adverse conduct with respect to the employee.
[Vol. 26:997
